Affirmitive Action

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke were decided on June 28th, 1978. This case questioned the validity of affirmative action. Allan Bakke questioned whether the special admissions program for The Medical School of the University of California at Davis was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This clause states, “no persons in the United States shall, on the ground of race color, or national group, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
The Medical school of the University of California opened in 1968. There were fifty students in the first class, and by 1971 the class size increased to one hundred. Out of the original fifty students only three were Asian, and there were no African-Americans, Hispanics, or Native American Indians. At this time there was no admissions program to assist disadvantaged students. So, the faculty created a separate program for “disadvantage” applicants. A series questions were asked to ascertain which application program the applicant would be put into. Those question being, whether the applicant wanted to be classified as economically, or educationally disadvantaged, and if they wanted to be classified as a minority. Ethnicities classified as minority included, “blacks,” “Chicanos,” “Asians,” and “American Indians.” The Chairman of the Special Admissions program would review each applicant to assess level of disadvantage, and then a special committee would review the application, like the regular application process. A major difference in the special admission program, and regular program, is the minimal grade point average to be cut off. The regular candidates had a minimal grade point average of a 2.5, while the special program did not. The ratio of regular applicants invited to interview was one of six, while the special applicants was one of five. The special applicants were not compared to the regular applicants either. Out of fifty spots, eight of the acceptances needed to be from the special admissions program, and when the size of the class double the number of special applicant acceptances double as well. In 1974 the special admissions programs brought twenty-one black, thirty Mexican-American, and twelve Asian. The regular admissions program accepted minority applicants as well. At this time the term disadvantaged referred to minority applicants.
The petitioner, Allan Bakke, is a white male who applied to Davis Medical School in 1973 and 1974. He was considered for regular admissions both years, and received an interview both years as well. After his first rejection he wrote to Dr. George H. Lowry, Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee to express dissent with the special admissions program based on race. Bakke was rejected after his second application as well. Both years Bakke applied, applicants were accepted with lower GPA, MCAT, and benchmark scores than Bakke and other rejected applicants. After the second rejection Bakke filed suit with the Superior Court of California, seeking mandatory consolation involving his admission status to the medical school. Bakke argued that his rejection through the general admissions program was based on his race, which is in violation of the 14th Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause. In the Superior Court of California Justice Holmes felt the idea of discrimination, along with “equal protection under the law,” varies according to the time. This court ruled in favor of the medical school, “Title IV must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.” The special admissions program was based on race and ethnic origin, and in an attempt to create a more diverse environment; conducive for an enriching environment others were put at a disadvantage. White applicants had to compete for eighty-four seats, while the full one hundred positions were open for minority applicants. Because of the lower standards minority applicants had to meet, and the greater number of seats to fill in the accepted application, it creates a feeling of resentment form those apart of the majority. A patronizing notion is created as well, because the special admissions programs implies that many of those apart of the minority cannot gain admission, without lower standards. It is also held that a state must justify subject classification, and prove he benefit to be constitutional, and protect its interest. However, the court also recognizes the schools academic freedom, which is not stated, but in implied in the First Amendment. For this reason the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Special Admissions program was unconstitutional. However, there was many concurring, and dissenting point that left this case to be left open ended for future cases. The dubious conclusion of this case effected future cases of a similar nature.
Barbra Grutter v. Lee Bollinger was decided June 23rd, 2003. This case also addressed with the constitutionality of the affirmative action process at University of Michigan Law School. This court’s are once again asking if it is constitutional to use race in considering an applicant. In 1992 an admissions policy to create a more diverse student body was created. However, unlike the Bakke case, race was not the only factor in determining diversity. In the application, questions about experiences, talents, and how the applicant could potentially add diversity to the academic setting were asked. These questions had the intent of being flexible, so each applicant could prove their uniqueness or diversity, using a matter other than race. These personal questions along with, GPA, LSATs, and recommendations were used to deliberate an applicant’s acceptance.
Barbara Grutter is a white female, and Michigan resident. She applied in 1996 possessing a 3.8 GPA, ad 161 LSAT score, and was initially put on the waiting list, and then rejected. In 1997 she filed suit with the United States District Court, against the law school. She, like Bakke, argued that her rejection was based on race and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. She also inferred that race is the predominant acceptance factor. Date from the acceptance from 1995 to 2000 was evaluated from a Dr. Lamtz. He concluded that race is an immensely strong factor, in acceptances made in those five years, but not the predominant one. Another doctor, Dr. Raudenbush also researched the effect of having a racially blind application process and inferred that is would have negative effects. It would most likely decrease the thirty-five percent unrepresented minorities accepted by ten percent. Justice Powell agreed with the use of race to create a diverse student body, but was adamant in including the fact that race is only one aspect of diversity. They concluded that admissions programs must use diversity as a plus to an acceptance, and cannot envelop an ethnic group. “…Place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.” The court ultimately ruled that it is constitutional to include race in applications; however, a time limit was put of twenty-five years. They decided to make it temporary because racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, and it is possible that in twenty-five years that race will not be relevant. Affirmative action was not only an issue pertaining to applications, but in the Federal Government contracts as well.
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena was decided June 12th, 1995. The Petitioner, Adarand, argued the Federal Government giving incentives to general contractors on government project to hire subcontractors controlled by, “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,” was in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The Central Federal Lands Highway Division endowed the Colorado to Mountain Gravel and Construction Company a major contract. Mountain Gravel then Adarand, and Gonzales Construction Company both submitted bids for the guardrail contracts, which Gonzales Company won. Mountain Gravel received compensation for choosing the “socially and economically disadvantaged,” controlled company. The government argued that this is a program based on disadvantage, not race, so the scrutiny should be less than those issues involving race. The court said although the racial classification come with good intentions, or “benign,” more than beneficial motives must be present to receive resources which use racial classification systems, and ultimately ruled that this program was unconstitutional.

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