A Congress of Self-Interest

In Congress and the Quest for Power, Lawrence C. Dodd provides an incredibly cynical view of the nature of Congress. He argues that the only goal of Congressmen is power. While I disagree with the assumptions present behind his arguments, I loved his metaphor as congress as a kaleidoscope: something that, at first glance, appears simple and comprehensive, but subject to constant transformations.

 

“These transformations seem to flow naturally from the prior observations, yet the resulting mosaic is quite different and is not ordered by the same static interpretations used to interpret and understand the earlier one.” (American Government: Readings and Cases, p. 344).

 

As time goes by, political scientist’s interpretations of this vital component of American government change, much like the kaleidoscope Dodd described. However, one's interpretation of the abstract shapes and bright colors of Congress may be completely different than another's.

 

Woodrow Wilson, in Congressional Government, agrees that there are many different shapes of Congress. He argues that the public must struggle to understand its complex structures of committees and subcommittees. The enormous amount of leaders and decentralization of power make it complicated, he says.

 

This complex sharing of power allows those on the outside to see the legislature as a whole body, mutually agreeing to a decision through roll-call votes. However, the reality is that Congress is ruled by committees, and that roll-call votes are a relatively unimportant part of the system.

 

“The prerogatives of the Committees represent something more than a mere division of labor,” Wilson says (American Government: Readings and Cases, p. 334). He argues that the committees rule without hindrance in their assigned area. They determine what bills get sent to the full House for a roll call vote, and, Wilson believes, prescribe the decisions of the House.

 

“So it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition whilst Congress in committee rooms is Congress at work” (American Government: Readings and Cases, p. 334).

 

In Congress and the Quest for Power, Lawrence C. Dodd argued that the Congressional committees are a way for representatives to satisfy an intrinsic desire for personal power.

 

He argues that the first lesson that any Congressman learns on this quest is the necessity of reelection. Reelection for multiple terms in a row is necessary to stay on the path toward positions of power in important committees. Reelection also reaffirms a feeling of political legitimacy.

 

Representatives accomplish this by casework and contact with their constituents. They avoid making important policy decisions that have to potential to split the electorate. After they start shoring up large margins against challengers and experience in Congress, Congressmen progress along a ladder of upward mobility, encompassing five stages of power.

 

First, one is elected. In the second stage, members begin to occupy themselves with national policy matters, seeking service on committees that draft legislation on things like interstate commerce, education, or labor. A third stage exists on a power committee. Power committees include Rules, Ways and Means, Finance, and Appropriations Committees. Finally, the forth stage involves being a party leader on the floor, or the Speaker of the House. With every stage comes a greater responsibility and a greater control over public policy.

 

However, once one reaches these new levels, one must continue to maintain the support of constituents and other party leaders. “To utilize fully the power prerogatives that are implicit in specific power positions, a member must maintain the respect, awe, trust, and confidence of House colleagues; he or she must sustain an aura of personal authority that is necessary to legitimize the exercise of power” (American Government: Readings and Cases, p. 349).

 So, although these individual members of Congress have a great deal of individual power over the fate of legislation, they must constantly be justifying their authority, thus maintaining the appearance of a democracy. 

 

Dodd also argues that the committee system began as a result of this complex desire for power in the hearts of Representatives. This way, power is evenly distributed over a greater amount of people, rather than being centralized in the hands of a single leader.

 

“Whatever the end product of their effort may be, members of Congress have actively sought to design a congressional structure and process that would maximize their ability to exercise personal power within Congress and, through Congress, within the entire nation at large.” (American Government: Readings and Cases, p. 346).

 

Dodd sees many advantages to the committee system, including the fact that Representatives are able to specialize in one particular area of legislation and allows for profound oversight of public policy. The committees also bring a greater amount of people in to share responsibility.

 

However, the committee system has many drawbacks, in Dodd’s opinion. For example, its lack of centralized leadership undermines its internal decision-making capacity and external power. Related to lack of leadership is a lack of fiscal coordination. Committees do not work together as closely as they should to make sure that legislation conforms to the budget.

 

Lastly, there is a lack of accountability and responsibility. “No serious way exists to hold a specific committee chair accountable to the majority views of Congress or the American People” (American Government: Readings and Cases, p. 351).

 

Further, these committee meetings are sometimes insulated from the view of the public. Their closed nature, the multiplicity of them, and their blurred boundaries make it difficult to track legislation. 

 

Dodd says that decentralized power allows the executive to gain power over the legislature. As a result, Congress starts to lose power. In an effort to maintain personal power, Congressmen enact reforms to clear a Congressional “log-jam.” As the logjam clears, authority goes back to a decentralized state, and an imperial executive once again starts to seize power from Congress. This creates a full cycle of legislative power around the executive.

 

I disagree completely with Dodd when he describes the motivations of Congressmen as purely for personal power. It is silly to make such a broad and sweeping statements about 535 people. He also doesn’t explain why some members of Congress don’t begin the upward accent up the ladder, despite reelection. Some members are content to stay at the bottom ranks. Dodd also classifies “hope to construct a better world” under personal power. I don’t see how something as altruistic as helping to create a better world constitutes a pursuit of personal power.

 

I believe Dodd is oversimplifying the methods and motivations of the individual Congressmen. While personal interests may be part of the picture, I am sure that all Congressmen are driven by some sense of altruism or duty, and not merely by self-interest. I think his view is over-the-top cynical.

 

Morris P. Fiorina, in his article titled The Rise of the Washington Establishment, supports this notion of Congressional self-interest and describes election as a necessary victory toward the achievement of goals.  “The primary goal of the typical Congressman is reelection,” he says (American Government: Readings and Cases, p. 335).

 

As a means to this goal, Congressmen use three means to maintain their seats in Congress: lawmaking, pork-barreling, and casework. Lawmaking may cost voters, while pork-barreling and case work are “free.”

 

Fiorona argues that the Washington establishment remains in place because of a large cycle of events, which starts and ends with the Congressman.

 

Congressmen earn reelection by using pork-barrel and casework. They establish various federal programs in general terms, which creates a large Bureaucracy to run and enforce the program. Next, a constituent talks with the Congressman about the problems he has with the federal bureaucracy, and the cycle begins again when the Congressman does casework for the constituent. This leads to large government programs. “Congress does not just react to big government- it creates it” (American Government: Readings and Cases, p. 341). Hence, the self-interest of reelection strengthens the power of government.  

 

While there are clear problems with pork-barreling and casework, I think these two forms of securing electoral victory make the Congressman necessarily responsive to his constituents. He must always be forced to confront them with his decisions. These short term limits make the Congressman more responsive to the will of the people, despite a Congress that sometimes insulated from majority rule through the use of committees. 

--Juan